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Dining Cryptographers are Practical
Christian Franck Jeroen van de Graaf
Abstract. The dining cryptographers protocol provides information-
theoretically secure sender and recipient untraceability. However, the
protocol is impractical because a malicious participant who disrupts the
communication is hard to detect. We propose a scheme with optimal col-
lision resolution, in which computationally limited disruptors are easy to
detect.
1 Introduction
The Dining Cryptographers protocol [4] is a special primitive for anonymous
communication in which senders and recipients are unconditionally untraceable.
Unlike relay-based techniques like mixing or onion routing, it requires no as-
sumption on the network, no cryptographic assumptions and no third party.
Because of these advantages it could be useful in many scenarios like electronic
voting, low latency anonymous communication or multiparty computation.
During a typical round of the protocol, the participants P1, ..., Pn respectively
broadcast the ciphertexts O1, ..., On. Each ciphertext Oi looks like a random
value, but the sum of all the ciphertexts C =
∑n
i=1Oi reveals an anonymous
messageM (i.e., C = M). The sender remains unknown; that is, each participant
could be the sender of the message. The protocol typically comprises two steps:
1. During the first step, each pair of participants Pi and Pj secretly agrees on
a key Kij . This can be represented by a key graph like the one shown in
Figure 1.1(a). By definition Kji = −Kij and Kii = 0.
2. During the second step, each participant Pi computes a ciphertext Oi by
computing the sum of his secret keys; i.e., Oi =
∑
j Kij . The anonymous
sender additionally adds his message M . This is illustrated in Figure 1.1(b).
Since Kij +Kji = 0, all secret keys cancel in the sum C, and only the message
M remains. When several participants try to send a message during the same
round, the messages collide (e.g. C = M +M ′+M ′′) and no meaningful data is
transmitted.
A major problem of the protocol is that no communication can take place
if a malicious participant deliberately creates collisions all the time. As the
anonymity of the honest participants must not be compromised, the detection of
such a disruptor is difficult. While computationally secure variation have been
proposed, no efficient and practically usable solution has been proposed for the
information-theoretical setting until today.
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(a) Key graph showing which partici-
pants Pi and Pj share a secret key Kij
(and its inverse Kji := −Kij).
O1 = K12 +K13 +K14 +K15
(sender)
O2 = K21 +K23+K24+K25+M
O3 = K31 +K32 +K34 +K35
O4 = K41 +K42 +K43 +K45
O5 = K51 +K52 +K53 +K54
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
(b) Ciphertexts Oi are computed using the
secret keys Kij . The sender also add his mes-
sage M .
Fig. 1.1. Computation of ciphertexts in the dining cryptographers protocol.
Related Work In [6], Golle and Juels used the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
to construct ciphertexts with an algebraic structure that can be used in zero-
knowledge proofs. More recently, Franck showed in [5] how to use such cipher-
texts to detect cheating participants in the context of collision resolution algo-
rithms. However, this approach does not offer the unconditional anonymity of
the initial protocol.
Our Contribution In this paper, we present a novel unconditionally untrace-
able dining cryptographers scheme with optimal collision resolution, in which
computationally restricted disruptors are easy to detect. We use Pedersen com-
mitments to computationally bind participants to their secret keys and then
we use these commitments to prove the correct retransmission of messages in a
tree based collision resolution algorithm (We use verifiable superposed receiving,
presented by Pfitzmann in [9] and Waidner in [10]).
We believe our scheme is a significant improvement over the reservation based
technique of the initial dining cryptographers protocol [4], wherein the detection
of disruptors is lengthy and cumbersome. We see possible applications in various
areas like low latency anonymous communication and electronic voting.
Outline of the Paper The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
contains the preliminaries. In Section 3, we show how we extend the dining
cryptographers scheme with Pedersen commitments. In Section 4, we show how
the commitments can be used to construct statements that can be used in zero-
knowledge proofs. In Section 5, we show how to implement verifiable collision
resolution. Section 6 contains some practical considerations. Section 7 is about
related work, and Section 8 concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss the assumptions and the primitives that we use in the
the rest of the paper.
Computational Assumptions We assume a group of n participants P1, ..., Pn
that can be modeled by poly-time turing machines. We need a short-time com-
putational assumption to verify the correct execution of the protocol in zero-
knowledge. The anonymity of the transmitted data is unconditionally secure.
Communication Channels We assume a secure communication channel be-
tween each distinct pair of participants Pi and Pj , and we assume a fully con-
nected key graph.
We further assume a reliable synchronous broadcast channel [7], which allows
each participant Pi ∈ P to send a message to all other participants. The recipients
thus have the guarantee that all then receive the same message, and that this is
the same unfalsified message that was send out by the sender.
Pedersen Commitments [8] Let G be a group of order q in which the discrete
logarithm problem is assumed to be hard, and let g and h be randomly chosen
generators of a G. To commit to secret K ∈ Zq, the committer choses random
r ∈ Zq and computes the commitment
c := gKhr.
The committer can open the commitment by revealing (K, r). Such a commit-
ment is unconditionally hiding, which means that K is perfectly secret until the
commitment is opened. Further, such a commitment is computationally binding,
which means that it is computationally hard to find (K ′, r′) 6= (K, r), such that
c = gK
′
hr
′
. And finally, such commitments are homomorphic; which means that
for c = gKhr and c′ = gK
′
hr
′
, we also have c′′ = cc′ = gK+K
′
hr+r
′
.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs A zero-knowledge proofs allows a prover to convince
a verifier that he knows a witness which verifies a given statement, without
revealing the witness or giving the verifier any other information. One can for
instance construct a zero-knowledge proof to show the knowledge of a discrete
logarithm, the equality of discrete logarithms with different bases, and logical ∧
(and) and ∨ (or) combinations thereof. A system for proving general statements
about discrete logarithms was presented in [3]. In our notation based on [2],
secrets are represented by greek symbols.
Example 1. A proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of y to the base g as
PK{α : y = gα}.
3 Extended Scheme with Pedersen Commitments
In this section, we propose a way to extend the dining cryptographers scheme
using Pedersen commitments. We let each participant Pi, i ∈ {1, ..., n} broadcast
a tuple (Oi, ci) ∈ Zq × G instead of just broadcasting Oi. The element ci is
a Pedersen commitment to the value Ki. The algebraic (discrete log based)
structure of ci will later allow to prove statements about Oi in zero-knowledge.
As ci is unconditionally hiding, the security of the original protocol is preserved.
Detailed Description During the setup phase, when participants Pi and Pj ,
i 6= j agree on a secret key Kij ∈ Zq, we require them to additionally agree on a
second secret value rij ∈ Zq. Similarly to Kji = −Kij , we define rji = −rij . To
simplify the description we further define rii = 0. The value rij is then used by
participant Pi to commit to the secret key Kij , using the Pedersen commitment
cij := g
Kijhrij .
Note that Pi and Pj know the secrets rij and Kij , so that both of them can
compute and open cij . This knowledge is used by Pj to further provide Pi with
a digital signature
Sj(cij).
This digital signature can later be used by Pi to prove the authenticity of cij
to a third party. Revealing cij and Sj(cij) will not give away any information
about Kij, since cij is unconditionally hiding.
If participant Pi’s ciphertext Oi does not contain a message, we have
Oi = Ki
where
Ki :=
n∑
j=1
Kij .
A Pedersen commitment for Ki can be computed from ci1, ..., cin according to
ci :=
n∏
j=1
cij .
This aggregation of commitments is illustrated in Figure 3.1, where P1 computes
the commitment c1 for the ciphertext O1 = K1. This commitment c1 could be
opened by P1 using K1 and
∑n
j=1 r1j .
During the broadcast phase, the participants P1, ..., Pn respectively send the
tuples (O1, c1), ..., (On, cn). The commitments c1, ..., cn are valid if
n∏
i=1
ci = 1. (3.1)
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O1 = K12 +K13 +K14 +K15︸ ︷︷ ︸
c1 = c12 · c13 · c14 · c15
P1
Fig. 3.1. Example: Binding to the secret keys using shared Pedersen commitments.
Participant P1 agrees on the secret keys K12,K13,K14,K15 ∈ Zq and the secret values
r12, r13, r14, r15 ∈ Zq respectively with the participants P2, P3, P4 and P5. This allows
him to compute the commitments c12, c13, c14, c15 ∈ G with cij = g
Kijhrij . Finally, he
computes c1 =
∏5
j=2 c1j , the commitment for K1 :=
∑5
j=2 K1j .
If (3.1) does not hold, this means that at least one participant cheated. To find
the cheater(s) an investigation phase can be performed.
During such an investigation phase, each participant Pi will publish the secret
keys cij and the corresponding signatures Sj(cij) for j ∈ {1, ..., n}\{i}. The
signatures have to be correct, and it must hold that
ci =
n∏
j=1
cij (3.2)
and
cijcji = 1. (3.3)
If a signature is wrong or if (3.2) or (3.3) does not hold, then the corresponding
participant Pi cheated. The fact that (3.1) and (3.3) must hold is because we have
Kij = −Kji and rij = −rji by construction, and (3.2) must hold by definition.
4 Statements for Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In this section, we propose statements that can be used in zero-knowledge proofs.
Statements about Single Rounds During a single round of the dining cryp-
tographers protocol, a participant Pi broadcasts a ciphertext (Oi, ci). Either we
have Oi = Ki or Oi = Ki+M . A statement that holds when Oi does not encode
a message M is given in Theorem 1. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. If a poly-time participant Pi generates the tuple (Oi, ci) and Pi
knows α such that ci = g
Oihα, then we have Oi = Ki.
Statements about Multiple Rounds In order to discuss multiple rounds, we
use a superscript (k) to denote a value of a round k. E.g., the values O
(1)
i , O
(2)
i
and O
(3)
i denote the ciphertexts broadcasted by Pi during the rounds 1, 2 and 3
respectively.
Theorem 2 provides a statement that holds when ciphertexts of two rounds
encode the same message.
Theorem 2. If a poly-time participant Pi generates the tuples (O
(1)
i , c
(1)
i ) and
(O
(2)
i , c
(2)
i ), and Pi knows α such that c
(1)
i (c
(2)
i )
−1 = gO
(1)
i
−O
(2)
i hα, then O
(1)
i and
O
(2)
i encode the same message.
Theorem 3 provides a statement that holds when a message encoded in a
first ciphertext is encoded at most once in a series of other ciphertexts (while
the rest of the ciphertexts does not encode a message).
Theorem 3. If a poly-time participant Pi generates (O
(1)
i , c
(1)
i ), ..., (O
(l)
i , c
(l)
i ),
and Pi knows α such that
l∧
k=2



c(1)i
k∏
j=2
(c
(j)
i )
−1 = gO
(1)
i
−
∑
k
j=2 O
(j)
i hα

 ∨
(
c = gO
(k)
i hα
) (4.1)
then at most one ciphertext of O
(2)
i , ..., O
(l)
i encodes the same message as O
(1)
i ,
while the other ciphertexts of O
(2)
i , ..., O
(l)
i encode no message.
The statements from the preceding theorems can be used in zero-knowledge
proofs. We will see in the next section how we can use this for proving the correct
execution of a collision resolution algorithm.
5 Implementing Verifiable Superposed Receiving
Superposed receiving is a collision resolution scheme for the Dining Cryptogra-
phers protocol proposed by Pfitzmann in [9] and Waidner in [10]. It achieves an
optimal throughput of one message per round. However, the scheme was never
used in practice, as a malicious participant may disrupt the process and remain
undetected. In this section, we show that in our scheme such disruptors are easy
to detect.
Superposed Receiving A collision occurs when multiple participants send
a message in the same round. In superposed receiving, collisions are repeatedly
split in two, until all messages are transmitted. An exemplary collision resolution
tree is shown in Figure 5.2. To keep our description simple, we assume that when
a collision occurs in a round k, the rounds 2k and 2k + 1 are used to split this
collision. Like in the previous section, we use subscripts to denote values of the
different rounds, e.g. O(7) for ciphertext of round 7.
MM
M
M
(a) No message. (b) Retransmit in
round 2k.
(c) ’Retransmit’ in
round 2k + 1.
round id
k
2k
2k + 1
Fig. 5.1. Retransmission in superposed receiving. Only message involved in the in the
collision in round k may be retransmitted either in round 2k. No new message may be
sent during the collision resolution process.
In superposed receiving messages are tuples of the form (1,m). It is then
possible to determine the number of messages involved in a collision and to
compute the average value of a message involved in the collision. For instance,
when 3 messages (1,m), (1,m′) and (1,m′′) collide in round k, the tuple (3,m+
m′+m′′) is received and the average value is then (m+m′+m′′)/3. Then, in round
2k only the messages with a value below this average are retransmitted, while
the rest of the messages goes to round 2k + 1. To keep our description simple,
we assume that a tuple of the form (1,m) is encoded in a message M ∈ Zq, such
that the individual elements of the tuple are added when there is a collision.
It is not necessary to transmit anything in round 2k+1. Instead, the result of
round 2k+1 is inferred by subtracting the results of round 2k from the result of
round k. This technique, which is also known as inference cancellation [11], is the
reason for the optimal throughput of the scheme. In the example of Figure 5.2
only 5 rounds are transmitted for 5 messages. For inference cancellation to work,
the collision resolution must operate in blocked access mode. This means that
no new message may be sent by any participant until the collision resolution
process is over.
Verification A malicious participant may try to disrupt the collision resolution
process by not properly participating in the collision resolution process. We verify
the correct execution of the protocol in two steps.
First, we verify in round 2k that, according to Figure 5.1, a participant
either retransmits exactly the same message that he sent in round k, or that he
sends no message at all. Using the statements from the previous section, each
participant can prove that his ciphertext O2k is correct, without revealing if
whether it contains a message or not. To do this, the participant generates a
zero-knowledge proof that proves that he knows α such that
PK{α : (c
(2k)
i = g
O
(2k)
i hα) ∨ (c
(k)
i c
(2k)−1
i = g
O
(k)
i
−O
(2k)
i hα)} (5.1)
holds. With this proof he can convince a verifier that he participated correctly,
without compromising the anonymity of the protocol. As described before, in
some rounds no transmission takes place and so there might no be a value O
(k)
i
available to prove the correctness of O
(2k)
i using statement (5.1). However, it is
still possible to prove that O
(2k)
i is correct by proving that a message contained
in the nearest transmitted parent round is transmitted at most once in all the
branches down to O
(2k)
i . This can be done using Theorem 3.
Example 2. In the collision resolution process shown in Figure 5.2, a participant
proves for O(2) that
PK{α : (c
(2)
i = g
O
(2)
i hα) ∨ (c
(1)
i c
(2)−1
i = g
O
(1)
i
−O
(2)
i hα)}
holds, then for O(4) that
PK{α : (c
(4)
i = g
O
(4)
i hα) ∨ (c
(2)
i c
(4)−1
i = g
O
(2)
i
−O
(4)
i hα)}
holds, then for O(6) that
PK{α : (c
(6)
i = g
O
(6)
i hα) ∨ (c
(1)
i c
(2)−1
i c
(6)−1
i = g
O
(1)
i
−O
(2)
i
−O
(6)
i hα)}
holds, then for O(14) that
PK{α : (c
(14)
i = g
O
(14)
i hα) ∨ (c
(1)
i c
(2)−1
i c
(6)−1
i c
(14)−1
i = g
O
(1)
i
−O
(2)
i
−O
(6)
i
−O
(14)
i hα)}
holds.
This shows that it is possible to verify that a participant retransmitted his
message in only one branch of the tree.
Then, we verify that every properly collision splits into 2 parts. As we know
that every collision is supposed to split, we know if all messages end up in the
same branch then at least one participant cheated. So this can only happen
when a malicious node retransmits message in the wrong branch, or when the
message is not of the correct form (1,m) initially. If such activity is detected, it is
possible to identify the disruptor by falling fall back to probabilistic splitting of
collisions [5,11]. Each participant then choses randomly whether to retransmit
his message in round 2j or round 2j + 1. This allows to separate the honest
nodes from the malicious ones after a few rounds. After this separation has taken
place it is possible to determine the messages that have not been transmitted
in the right branch earlier, and to identify the corresponding participants using
a zero-knowledge proof (I.e. each participant has to prove in zero-knowledge
that he did not send the message that appeared in the wrong branch.). If a
collision repeatedly does not split, even with probabilistic retransmission, then
the involved participants can be considered to be malicious.
A disruptor will thus always be detected and can be banned from the group
of participants.
round id k
1 C
(1) =
∑n
i=1 O
(k)
1
2 C
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2
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(3) = C(1) − C(2)
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6 C
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i=1 O
(k)
6
7 C
(7) = C(3) − C(6)
14 C
(14) =
∑n
i=1 O
(k)
14
15 C
(15) = C(7) − C(14)
C(k)
M1 +M2 +M3 +M4 +M5︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5, 130)
M2 +M4︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2, 28)
M2︸︷︷︸
(1, 11)
< 14
M4︸︷︷︸
(1, 17)
< 26
M1 +M3 +M5︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3, 102)
M3︸︷︷︸
(1, 28)
< 34
M1 +M5︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2, 74)
M1︸︷︷︸
(1, 36)
< 37
M5︸︷︷︸
(1, 38)
Fig. 5.2. Exemplary binary collision resolution tree with superposed receiving. In
rounds 1,2,4,6 and 14, ciphertexts O(k) are transmitted, and C(k) is computed using
these ciphertexts. In rounds 3,5,7 and 15, no data is transmitted and C(k) is computed
using data from the parent and the sibling node.
6 Practical Considerations
This section contains a few remarks about various aspects of a practical imple-
mentation.
(Signatures with Merkle Trees) During the setup, participants mutually authen-
ticate their commitments cij and cji using the signatures Sj(cij) and Si(cji). For
many rounds, this can be implemented more efficiently using a Merkle tree.
(Mutual Signatures Attack) During the setup phase one participant could refuse
to agree an a shared secret with another participant. I.e., one participant could
refuse to provide a signature S(.) to the other participant. As a response to this,
we suggest that each participant may just publicly claim that he is not sharing
a secret key with the other participant. It is then assumed the corresponding
Kij = 0 and cij = 1, and no signature is required.
(Efficient Investigation in Packet-Switched Networks) In order to efficiently de-
tect disruptors, a single (trusted) investigator can collect and verify the proofs.
Only when he detects a cheater, he will provide all other participants with a
copy of the relevant data.
(Long Messages) To keep the description simple, we assumed that messages fit
in a single element of Zq; i.e., that a single K is sufficient for one round. For
longer messages one can, as shown in [1], use a randomly chosen generator tuple
g, g′, g′′, ..., h to commit to a vector (K,K ′,K ′′, ...) by computing
c = gKg′K
′
g′K
′′
...hr.
(Key Establishment) To obtain information-theoretical security from the proto-
col, it is necessary to use real random secret keys for each round. In practice, it
is also possible to realize weaker system, where the shared secrets are generated
for instance using the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have shown how to extend the dining cryptographers scheme with Pedersen
commitments, such that it is possible to construct zero-knowledge proofs about
the retransmission of data, without compromising the anonimity of the protocol.
It is remarkable that it is then possible realize a verifiable dining cryptogra-
phers protocol with an optimal throughput, which does not require any kind of
reservation phase prior to the transmission of the messages.
We believe that our approach is a significant step forward towards the efficient
implementation of unconditionally untraceable communication systems.
We see possible applications in many fields, like low-latency untraceable com-
munication and secret shuffling. The main problem that remains in practice is
the secure agreement on secret keys between participants.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1. Given randomly chosen generators g, h of a group in which the
discrete log problem is assumed to hold, a poly-time participant can only find
(a, b), (a′, b′), such that when gahb = ga
′
hb
′
, it must hold that a = a′.
Proof. If a poly-time participant can find (a, b), (a′, b′) such that gahb = ga
′
hb
′
with a 6= a′, then he can also compute the discrete logarithm logh g with
logh g = (b
′ − b)/(a− a′).
As this is impossible by assumption, the statement follows. 
Theorem 4. If a poly-time participant Pi generates the tuple (Oi, ci) and Pi
knows α such that ci = g
Oihα, then we have Oi = Ki.
Proof. By definition, we have ci = g
Kihri . If poly-time participant Pi knows Oi
and α, such that ci = g
Oihα, it follows from Lemma 1 that Oi = Ki. 
Theorem 5. If a poly-time participant Pi generates the tuples (O
(1)
i , c
(1)
i ) and
(O
(2)
i , c
(2)
i ), and Pi knows α such that c
(1)
i (c
(2)
i )
−1 = gO
(1)
i
−O
(2)
i hα, then O
(1)
i and
O
(2)
i encode the same message.
Proof. By definition, we have O
(2)
i = K
(2)
i +Ma and O
(1)
i = K
(1)
i +Mb, where
Ma,Mb ∈ Zq. Further, we have
c
(1)
i (c
(2)
i )
−1 = gO
(1)
i
−O
(2)
i hα
gK
(1)
i
−K
(2)
i hr
(1)
i
−r
(2)
i = gO
(1)
i
−O
(2)
i hα.
According to Lemma 1 it follows that K
(1)
i −K
(2)
i = O
(1)
i −O
(2)
i and thus
Ma = Mb,
which is the statement. 
Theorem 6. If a poly-time participant Pi generates (O
(1)
i , c
(1)
i ), ..., (O
(l)
i , c
(l)
i ),
and Pi knows α such that
l∧
k=2



c(1)i
k∏
j=2
(c
(j)
i )
−1 = gO
(1)
i
−
∑
k
j=2 O
(j)
i hα

 ∨
(
c = gO
(k)
i hα
) (A.1)
then at most one ciphertext of O
(2)
i , ..., O
(l)
i encodes the same message as O
(1)
i ,
while the other ciphertexts of O
(2)
i , ..., O
(l)
i encode no message.
Proof. With ci := g
Kihri and Lemma 1 it follows that when (A.1) holds, we
have
l∧
k=2



O(1)i −K(1)i =
k∑
j=2
O
(j)
i −K
(j)
i

 ∨ (O(k)i = K(k)i )

 .
Assume the cipertext O1 encodes the message M , so that O1 = K1 + M
(with possibly M = 0). For k = 2, we can then have either Ok = Kk + M or
Ok = Kk. For k > 2 and
∑k−1
j=2 Oj −Kj = 0, we can have either Ok = Kk +M
or Ok = Kk. For k > 2 and
∑k−1
j=2 Oj − Kj = M , we must have Ok = Kk.
That is, for increasing k, as long as O2, ..., Ok−1 contains no message, we can
have either Ok = Kk + M or Ok = Kk. Once one ciphertext of O2, ..., Ok−1
contains the message M , we must have Ok = Kk. Thus, at most one ciphertext
of O2, ..., Ol may encode the message M encoded in O1, while the other ones
contain no message, which is the statement. 
